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The Director of Central Intelligence

Washington, D.C. 20505

National Intelligence Council

NIC No. 8330-83/1  
21 November 1983

MEMORANDUM FOR: See Distribution

FROM : [redacted] 25X1  
Assistant National Intelligence Officer for Western  
Europe

SUBJECT : Forecast and Warning Report

1. Attached is my report to the DCI based on our meeting held 16 November 1983. If there are any significant amendments or additions you would wish to make, please let me know. (U)

2. Next month's warning meeting will be on 14 December 1983 at 1015 in Room 7-E-62, CIA Headquarters. Please have your clearances passed and call [redacted] with names of the attendees by noon 13 December 1983. (U) 25X1

3. I also encourage you to phone in suggestions for the agenda and proposals to make opening presentations. It would be helpful to have your comments for the next meeting by Friday, 2 December 1983. (U)

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Attachment NIC No. 8330-83

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The Director of Central Intelligence  
Washington, D.C. 20505

NIC No. 8330-83  
21 November 1983

National Intelligence Council

MEMORANDUM FOR: Director of Central Intelligence  
Deputy Director of Central Intelligence

THROUGH : National Intelligence Officer for Warning

FROM : [redacted] 25X1  
Assistant National Intelligence Officer for Western Europe

SUBJECT : Monthly Forecast and Warning Report

The Bundestag INF Debate

The 21-22 November West German parliamentary debate on INF will be preceded by similar debates within three party congresses. The Green party congress will undoubtedly reject INF deployment and the special SPD convention is likely to give overwhelmingly support to a resolution that calls for a moratorium on NATO's deployment of Pershing II and cruise missiles. [redacted]


[redacted] analysts caution that even the Free Democrats could sponsor INF resolutions that qualify in certain respects their support for the deployment of Pershing II missiles in West Germany.

While the Kohl government is expected to gain a parliamentary majority in favor of INF deployment, the INF debate itself will have lasting repercussions on domestic politics, especially within the SPD. The position taken by former Chancellor Schmidt in the Bundestag debate could be critical to that party's future. Schmidt's criticism of his party's actions could also ease the pressure on Kohl to defend INF as an exclusively government policy.

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### Turkish Elections

The election victory of Turgut Ozal's Motherland Party, coming at the expense of an embarrassed President Evren, will not mark any immediate departures in Turkish foreign or domestic policy. Ozal's skill as a campaigner, his ability to coopt the dominant issue--economic revitalization--and his weaker links to the military probably accounted for his victory rather than any obvious policy differences with the generals. The voters generally support a transition to full democratic rule under the tutelage of the military and Evren, who will continue to play a dominant role. Analysts agreed that Ozal would avoid confrontation with Evren, hoping to capitalize on his ability to get the Turkish economy back on track before next year's municipal elections, when his party will face stiffer competition from successors to the banned Justice and Republican People's parties. To withstand their challenge, he will probably have to show progress on the economy, and also begin to differentiate his government from the military. Some analysts believe that he will succeed by sponsoring greater liberalization of the economy and moving toward amnesty legislation, while others believe that Evren's dominance in foreign policy and his more traditionally statist economic views will prevail.

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### CYPRUS

In the aftermath of the announced formation of the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus, analysts believe that all parties will strive to avoid any direct military confrontation and restrict their maneuvering primarily to the diplomatic level. We cannot rule out the possibility of routine military maneuvers or operations being misinterpreted as military reinforcements, but so far Greek and Turkish forces have made only marginal changes in their alert status.

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Over the longer-term, Turkish Cypriot independence probably does not rule out future inter-communal talks in

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some form. The Turkish Cypriots may believe their move has strengthened their bargaining position if the talks resume, but CIA analysts noted they will now have to be more forthcoming in negotiations, having played the only card they had. The major casualty of the declaration of independence is the initial positive West European response to the Turkish elections. Now Turkey faces growing isolation from Europe, which increases its dependence on the United States for economic and military assistance needs.

#### European Participation in the MNF

France, Italy and the United Kingdom remain committed to keeping their peace-keeping forces in Lebanon, but they hope for a gradual reduction in their roles. The French and Italian commitments are the strongest, as they view their participation in the MNF as a form of national prestige as well as a contribution to their broader security interests in the region. The British commitment is the weakest but also the smallest, amounting to fewer than 100 troops stationed in relatively safe positions. The Thatcher government is concerned about possible French or American retaliation against terrorists that could spark renewed large-scale fighting. If the UK were to pull out its forces, which seems unlikely at the moment, pressure on the Italian government to follow suit would grow, but probably would not precipitate an Italian departure so long as French participation seemed assured.

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